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1Demographic Transition, Environmental Concern and the
Kuznets Curve
Abstract:
In an endogenous growth model with pollution and abatement we charac-
terize the socially optimal solution. We ﬁnd that the rate of growth depends
negatively on the weight of environmental care in utility and positively on
t h ep o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t e .W ea l s oﬁnd a trade-oﬀ b e t w e e ng r o w t ha n de n -
vironmental quality beyond which an environmental Kuznets curve is derived
i nt h el o n gt e r m .T h i so n ee m e r g e sf r o mt h ei m p l i c a t i o n so ft h ed e m o g r a p h i c
transition for the rate of population growth, and the accompanying variation
in the willingness to pay for environmental quality as the economy develops.
Keywords: Optimal Growth, Environment, Population Growth, Prefer-
ences.
JEL classiﬁcation: C61, C62, O41, Q5.
21 Introduction
One important issue in ecological economics programmes has been the study
of the environmental Kuznets’ curve (EKC) hypothesis, which says that there
is an inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution emissions and per
capita income levels. Or, put in other way, that economic growth usually
leads to environmental degradation in the early stages of the process, but in
the end the best and probably the only way to attain a decent environment
is to become rich [Beckerman (1992)]. The EKC hypothesis has lead some
analysts to conclude that pollution will not be a problem in the long-run
because of the beneﬁcial eﬀects of economic growth on the environmental
quality. This proposition implicitly assumes that growth is essentially good
for the environment because as levels of income go up the emissions ﬂow will
decline. Consequently, no governmental interventions are needed.
However, it is well-known that only a naive interpretation of the EKC
hypothesis may lead people to believe that the best role for policy-makers
is to keep away from active environmental protection policies. As Arrow et
al. (1995) observed, growth is not a panacea for the environment, and in
no one case can be expected that the pollution problem will automatically
be solved as a result of economic growth without any government interven-
tion. In fact, growth creates the conditions for environmental improvement
by raising the demand for environmental quality once it has been reached
high levels of income per capita, but it is not a substitute for environmental
public policies which are necessary to control pollution emissions. There is no
reason to believe that the eventual positive relationship linking growth and
environmental quality is inevitable, because even though economic growth
3directly fosters higher abatement expenditures it also increases pollution. In
this context, policy has a very important role to play by promoting both
sustained growth and the environment.
Theoretical foundations for the EKC hypothesis have been proposed on
the ground of the short-run transitional dynamics generated into neoclassical
growth models [Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993), Selden and Song (1995),
Kelly (2003)], as well as in models of endogenous growth where pollution is
decoupled from the engine of growth under the premise that not every in-
crease in output due to technological advances will lead to increased pollution
[Byrne (1997)].1 Beyond these short-run dynamic interpretations of the EKC
for an isolated country, we supply a long-run alternative view connected with
the development process historically experienced by economies. This view,
moreover, gives theoretical support to the bulk of empirical studies, because
it allows for a well-deﬁned EKC based on the variability of population growth
rates and the willingness to pay for cleaner environment, while it leaves any
other technical and preference parameters unchanged.
All these questions will be analyzed more accurately here in a simple
model of endogenous growth. Our model builds upon the traditional Rebe-
lo’s (1991) one-sector AK model to which we incorporate pollution. Welfare
depends on consumption but also on the quality of the environment where
agents consume, i.e. households show environmental concern. In this model
pollution arises from production, as a by-product, and enters the consumer’s
1Alternative foundations for the EKC hypothesis may be found in Jones and Manuelli
(2001) built upon a dynamic overlapping generations model, but also in the context of a
static model as in McConnell (1997), Stokey (1998), Munasinghe (1999) or Andreoni and
Levinson (2001).
4utility function playing the role of an externality. We ignore any other pol-
lution externality which could play a role by aﬀecting the productivity of
factors. Pollution may be mitigated by means of emissions abatement ac-
tivities, which allow to control for the degree of dirtiness associated with
production technologies as well as for the net ﬂow of pollutants to the envi-
ronment. However, these activities are costly because they absorb resources,
reducing investment and consumption possibilities.
Since environmental preferences and population growth rates are decisive
in this framework, government may implement indirect policies such as in-
formation and awareness campaigns that make people more environmentally
conscious, enhance education levels, improve health, and perform population
control actions that accelerate the demographic transition process. These
long term policies may complement the more direct ones which focus on in-
centives to adopt cleaner technologies using environmental corrective taxes
and subsidies.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy and
introduces the assumptions featuring a general equilibrium one-sector en-
dogenous growth model. In sections 3 and 4 we study the Pareto optimal so-
lution assuming suﬃcient conditions for interiority. Using the unconstrained
trajectories, we characterize growth and analyze under which conditions sus-
tained balanced growth is feasible. Section 5 deals with the environmental
Kuznets’ curve hypothesis and the implications for environmental policies.
One major critique is that this relationship only describes statistically the
link between income and pollution, but does not explain why it occurs. In
this section we supply an alternative long term explanation for the EKC.
5Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2T h e e c o n o m y
The model economy is a one sector closed economy. Gross output Y is
obtained according to an aggregate production function of the AK type where
capital is the only factor needed to produce,
Y (t)=AK(t).( 1 )
Input K is an aggregate composite of diﬀerent sorts of capital which, in
a broad sense, includes physical as well as human capital. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that this production function arises from the direct
summation of the individual production functions for many identical ﬁrms.
In this economy there is an aggregate pollution ﬂow P (Y (t),B(t)),w h i c h
arises as a by-product of economic activity. The emissions ﬂow is increasing
with respect to gross output and decreasing with respect to abatement B,
i.e. P1 > 0 and P2 < 0. Function P (.) is assumed homogeneous of degree
zero, i.e. an equally proportional increase in both output and abatement
leaves the emissions ﬂow unchanged independently of the population size.
Consequently, it may be rewritten as






w h e r ew ea s s u m es t r i c tc o n c a v i t y :E0 < 0, lim
x→0+ E0 < 0, −∞ < lim
x→1− E0 < 0,
E00 < 0, E (0) = EM > 0 and E (1) = 0.A c t u a l l y ,EM represents an eﬀective
upper bound for the emissions function.
6The above-mentioned abatement eﬀort B, which is costly and endoge-
nously decided by agents, will be measured in terms of output in such a way
that these two variables relate to each other according to
B(t)=( 1− z(t))Y (t).( 3 )
Here z represents, as in Stokey (1998), a measure of the eﬀective dirtiness
of the technique used to produce. Obviously, z(t)=1−
B(t)
Y (t) ∈ [0,1] because
resources devoted to clean pollution could never pass the upper bound es-
tablished by current production. Therefore, any choice for z close to zero
or one automatically makes the existing technique less or more polluting re-
spectively. Taking as reference z =1which implies that no abatement eﬀort
is done and that emissions ﬂow reaches the maximum level EM,t h el a r g e r
the reduction in z t h em o r ee ﬀective the reduction in emissions. Or, put in
other words, as long as we produce with a cleaner technology, the eﬀective-
ness measured in terms of emissions reduction of any additional pollution
abatement that reduces z,w i l lb el a r g e r .
Moreover, according to the aggregate resources constraint, net output
may be devoted to consumption or capital accumulation. For the sake of
simplicity we do not consider capital depreciation. Hence, net investment




K (t)=Y (t) − B(t).( 4 )
This equation also reﬂects the cost of the abatement activity in a very
simple way. One unit of additional abatement eﬀort is transformed automat-
ically into a lower unit of output available for consumption or capital accu-
7mulation. This particular ‘one-to-one’ transformation, although not strictly
necessary, contributes to simplify our analysis.
The economy is populated by many identical and inﬁnitely lived agents.
Population, denoted by N, is assumed to be growing at a constant rate
0 <n<A . The initial population N(t0) is normalized to one. Individual
preferences are assumed to be represented by a twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable instantaneous utility function V (c(t),P(t)), which depends positively
on the current per capita consumption c and negatively on the emissions ﬂow
P [Gradus and Smulders (1993), Ligthart and Ploeg (1994), Selden and Song
(1995), Reis (2001)]. Under this assumption, households do not take care for
the stock of pollutants in the environment, but only for the current ﬂow of
polluting emissions. This may be justiﬁed on the basis that the local stock
eﬀect of pollution is assumed short-lived and the abatement activity, which
reduces emissions and facilitates regeneration, makes the local stock eﬀect
negligible.2
Using (2) and (3) we ﬁnd that P is an increasing monotonous transfor-
mation of z. Therefore, the instantaneous utility function may be written as
2This also implies that we ignore global stock eﬀects in the representation of households’
preferences. An important stream of literature considers that welfare depends on the
stock of pollution rather than on the current ﬂow [Huang and Cai (1994), Mohtadi (1996),
Tahvonen and Salo (1996), Byrne (1997), Kelly (2003)]. However, if the ﬂow of pollution
is increasing with production, then capital accumulation that increases future output also
increases future ﬂows of pollution. Hence, we ﬁnd a general consensus in the literature
[Gradus and Smulders (1993), Smulders and Gradus (1996), Aghion and Howitt (1998),
Reis (2001)] according to which, in the context of this model, if we consider the stock
of pollution as an argument in the utility function, we will obtain the same fundamental
results but at the cost of a more complex analysis.
8U (c(t),z(t)) with Uc > 0 and Uz < 0, where the two ordinal utility functions
represent the same preference ordering. Moreover, we assume decreasing
marginal utilities: Ucc < 0 and Uzz < 0, as well as strict concavity with
respect to both arguments taken together, UccUzz − (Ucz)
2 > 0.
Given that the structure of the model allows for the existence of a long-
run balanced growth path, deﬁned as an allocation in which consumption per
capita grows at a constant rate and the dirtiness index is constant, following
Bovenberg and Smulders (1995; 1996) and Smulders and Gradus (1996) we
assume that the particular instantaneous utility function is multiplicatively





α(1−Φ) .( 5 )
In this function, the parameter that represents the relative weight of en-
vironmental care in utility is assumed to be positive and lower than one,
0 < α < 1, and the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is allowed to be lower or greater than one, 0 < Φ ≶ 1.T h es t r i c t
concavity assumption requires as suﬃcient condition that the determinant




Given the presence of a welfare pollution externality, the equilibrium path
corresponding to the non-regulated competitive economy will not be Pareto
optimal. Agents have no individual incentives to internalize this negative ex-
ternality, which will lead to insuﬃcient abatement and too much pollution.
9This situation call for some kind of intervention because without any cor-
rective environmental policy, the environment will be damaged up to a level
of irreversible catastrophe and sustained growth, if there exists, will not be
sustainable [Aznar-Márquez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2004)]. Consequently, from
now on we will focus on the socially optimal solution for the model economy
described in the previous section, where the central planner internalizes all
the costs and beneﬁts associated with pollution abatement activities.
We will only study interior solutions. Accordingly, we solve the problem
and obtain the unconstrained optimal trajectories, for which we derive be-
low suﬃcient conditions on parameters that ensure the control constraints
hold. We use lowercase letters to represent variables in per capita terms. Un-
der these premises the planner’s problem consists in choosing the sequence
{c(t), z (t), t ≥ t0} which, for a given positive social rate of discount ρ >n ,













s.t. (1), (3), (4)
and k(t0)=k0 > 0.
Using q to represent the shadow price of k,t h eﬁrst order necessary
conditions are
q = c
−Φ (1 − z)
α(1−Φ) ,( 6 )
q =




As we have seen, gross product may be allocated to consumption, invest-
ment or abatement. On the margin, according to (6), goods must be equally
10valuable if they are consumed or accumulated as new physical capital, i.e. the
marginal utility of consumption today must be equal to the marginal shadow
value of physical capital (consumption tomorrow). According to (7), at equi-
librium the implicit price of a more dirty technique, qAk,m u s tb ee q u a lt o
the marginal utility of a cleaner one. Namely, the valuation of a marginal
reduction in resources devoted to abatement, which contributes to increase
consumption (present or future) as well as the stock of pollutants, must be
equal to the marginal utility of those resources when they are devoted to
abatement, which contribute to increase environmental quality. Moreover,
the dynamic conditions are
•
k= Akz − c − nk,( 8 )
•
q= ρq − Azq,( 9 )
together with the initial condition k0 and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞ e
−(ρ−n)(t−t0)qk =0 .( 1 0 )










Φ−α(1−Φ),( 1 1 )









Φ−α(1−Φ).( 1 2 )
Now, substituting (11) and (12) into (8) and (9), we get the dynamic
system
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Φ−α(1−Φ),( 1 3 )
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Φ−α(1−Φ),( 1 4 )
11with the initial condition k(t0)=k0 and the transversality condition (10).
These two diﬀerential equations conform a non-linear dynamic system, which
may be solved in closed form [Ruiz-Tamarit and Ventura-Marco (2004)]. We




A − ρ − α(ρ − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
(t − t0)
¾




A − ρ − α(ρ − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
(t − t0)
¾







Φ − α(1 − Φ)





.( 1 7 )
Given k0 equation (17), which arises from the transversality condition,
gives the initial value for q(t0). Once the two initial values are known,
equations (15) and (16) determine the complete trajectories for these two
variables. For any q(t0) other than the one supplied by (17) the economy
places on an explosive trajectory, which does not satisfy optimality condi-
tions. Moreover, given bx ≡ α
α(1−Φ)
Φ−α(1−Φ) > 0, the transversality condition holds
if, and only if, ax ≡
ρ−A+Φ(A−n)
Φ−α(1−Φ) > 0. This parameter constraint must be sat-
isﬁed for any positive intertemporal elasticity of substitution, i.e. 0 < Φ ≷ 1,
what is not obvious. However, the strict concavity assumption on the utility
function imposes the additional parameter constraint Φ > α(1 − Φ). Hence,
the transversality condition (10) holds if, and only if,
ρ >A (1 − Φ)+Φn.( 1 8 )
G i v e n( 1 5 )a n dt h ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o ni np e rc a p i t at e r m s ,w h i c ha r i s e s
from (1), we obtain
y(t)=Ak0 exp
½
A − ρ − α(ρ − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
(t − t0)
¾
.( 1 9 )








ρ − A + Φ(A − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
,( 2 0 )
z (t)=z
∗ =
AΦ − αρ + αΦn
A(Φ − α(1 − Φ))
.( 2 1 )
Moreover, the dirtiness index is expected to be bounded, i.e. 0 6 z∗ 6 1.
For this to be ensured we need additional parameter constraints. In particular
Φ(A − n)+n(Φ − α(1 − Φ)) > α(ρ − n),( 2 2 )
Φ(A − n) > A − ρ,( 2 3 )
where it may be easily checked that (23) encompasses (18).
4 Sustained growth and pollution
The previous results completely characterize the dynamic system correspond-
ing to the Pareto optimal solution. Along their respective optimal trajecto-
ries, the growth rates of per capita capital stock, consumption and output
are equal to each other and constant over time, while the rate of growth of






A − ρ − α(ρ − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
,( 2 4 )
γ
∗
z =0 .( 2 5 )
The ratio consumption to capital stock is constant and positive and the
dirtiness index remains ﬁxed forever at a constant value between zero and
13one. Therefore, the model does not predict transitional dynamics and all the
endogenous variables conform a balanced growth path from the beginning.
From (24), given Φ > α(1 − Φ), a positive rate of growth γ∗ > 0 arises
when A−ρ > α(ρ−n). This condition is compatible and may be combined
with the parameter constraint corresponding to the transversality condition,
as well as those representing the lower and upper bounds for z∗,g i v i n g
Φ(A − n)+n(Φ − α(1 − Φ)) > Φ(A − n) > A − ρ > α(ρ − n) > 0.( 2 6 )
The absence of transitional dynamics that makes the short-run identical
to the long-run simpliﬁes the comparative analysis for the socially optimal
rate of growth and dirtiness index. We ﬁnd the following parameter depen-






























.( 2 8 )
The signs associated with A, ρ and Φ are the usual in the canonical AK
model, i.e. the larger the capital productivity and the higher the patience
of agents, the greater the rate of growth. However, two new results are
found here. First, the more intuitive one, according to which the higher
the weight of environmental care in utility (higher values of α that imply a
higher marginal utility of abatement and a lower rate of return on capital) the
smaller the rate of growth (the central planner optimally decides to devote
more resources to abatement and less to capital accumulation and growth).
Second, the more striking result of a positive relationship between the rate of
growth and the population growth rate. This result depends on the presence
14of environmental care in the model, because only in such cases a higher
population growth rate leads the central planner to divert resources from
abatement and consumption towards capital accumulation. This eﬀect is
stronger as higher is the weight of environmental care in the utility function.3
The dirtiness index, in turn, depends positively on the productivity para-
meter when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one,
but the sign of this relationship cannot be analytically determined for values
of such elasticity lower than one. Moreover, for a positive balanced growth
path, the higher the patience of agents the higher the value of z.W h e nc o n -
sumers show a high level of patience, the central planner optimally decides
to reallocate resources towards capital accumulation, which enhance growth.
This is done so intensively that even diverts some of the resources previously
devoted to pollution abatement, which leads to produce with a more dirty
technique. Because of the crowding out eﬀect, we ﬁnd that the higher the
weight of environmental care in the utility function the smaller the dirtiness
index. Finally, we also ﬁnd that the greater the population growth rate the
higher the dirtiness associated with the eﬀective production technique. This
occurs because for higher population growth rates the central planner decides
to divert more resources from abatement eﬀort.4
These two variables are closely related to each other. Actually, we can
make this relationship evident using (6), (7) and (8). If we take the third
3A similar result may be found in Bartolini and Bonatti (2003).
4The results concerning the population growth rate are consistent with propositions
d i c u s s e da n dt e s t e di nC r o p p e ra n dG r i ﬃths (1994). In that paper, the environment is
not a factor that limits productivity as population expands, but a good which quality is
degraded by a growing population.
15one and divide by k, and then substitute for the ratio c
k from the ﬁrst two













∗.( 2 9 )
This positive relationship between γ∗ and z∗ suggests that, even though
conditions for a positive long-run rate of growth are satisﬁed, there is a trade-
oﬀ between growth and environmental quality. This trade-oﬀ, which results
from agent decisions, means that tighter pollution controls and increased
abatement that reduce the dirtiness index, will have negative eﬀects on the
optimal rate of growth. This fact reﬂects the previous crowding out result
according to which, greener preferences associated with a shift in preferences
towards more environmental concern, aﬀects negatively both the dirtiness
index and the rate of growth.
5 Long term environmental Kuznets’ curve
and environmental protection policies
Beyond the problem of the existence of an optimal long-run balanced growth
path we have to deal with the environmental Kuznets’ curve (EKC) hy-
pothesis, which suggests that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship
between pollution emissions and the level of income per capita. Recent em-
pirical work on this subject have documented cases, countries and types of
pollutants, for which the previous pattern holds [World Bank (1992), Hettige
et al. (1992), Shaﬁk and Bandyopadhyay (1992), Selden and Song (1994),
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995), Grossman and Krueger (1995), Cole et al.
16(1997), Bruyn et al. (1998), List and Gallet (1999), Harbaugh et al. (2000)].
Namely, economic growth leads to higher emissions until income reaches a
critical turning point, and thereafter as per capita income increases emissions
decrease. Some analysts recognize in this hypothesis the justiﬁcation for the
classical proposition which asserts that pollution will not be a problem in the
long term because of the beneﬁcial eﬀects of economic growth for the envi-
ronmental quality.5 Now, we will show that an inverted U-shaped function
connecting emissions and output per capita may also be deduced from our
own framework. Overall, we conclude that economic growth alone is not a
deﬁnitive solution for the environmental pollution problem and that there is
still wide scope for active environmental policies.
From a theoretical point of view, the EKC hypothesis has had a tradi-
tional intertemporal dynamic interpretation for an isolated country [Borghesi
(2001)], built upon growth models that show short-run transitional dynamics.
Our model, instead, because of its particular nature cannot produce transi-
tional dynamics. Consequently, we introduce here an alternative long-run
lecture of this hypothesis, which connects with the concept of development
and relates to some parameter changes experienced by economies along such
5According to this, if the EKC hypothesis is satisﬁed, instead of being a threat to
the environment, economic growth that moves the economy from lower to higher levels of
income per capita improves it. This conclusion is not generally accepted in the literature,
among other reasons because the EKC seems to be only a valid description for a subset of
all possible pollutants and countries [Grossman and Krueger (1996), Stern et al. (1996),
Bimonte (2001), Borghesi (2001)]. However, many authors have recommended a policy of
wait-and-see, based on an absolute trust in such a naive and misleading interpretation of
the EKC hypothesis.
17a process [Arrow et al. (1995), Bruyn (1997), Vincent (1997)].
Our construction relies on two cornerstones. On the one hand, beyond
the three most conventionally assumed channels whereby income growth af-
fects environmental quality (scale, composition and technique eﬀects), Gross-
man and Krueger (1995), McConnell (1997) and Panayotou (1997) consider
that the state of the environment may deteriorate or improve along time if
consumer tastes shift toward less or more environmental concern, causing
an autonomous shift in demands for environmental safeguards. In general,
diﬀerent levels of institutional and organizational development are accom-
panied by the corresponding diﬀerent levels in education and awareness of
the eﬀects of pollution. Therefore, we can identify three fundamental states.
First, the agricultural one where people live in a stationary equilibrium with
nature. Given that survival depends on environmental sustainability peo-
ple show a high environmental concern, which is incorporated in traditional
habits of consumption and inherited technics of production. This equilib-
rium is low in pollution intensity. Second, the industrial one where people
are more concerned with earning one’s own living and other material needs
and they show a low concern for environmental quality. Individuals cannot
aﬀord either much expenditure on abatement and, consequently, this state
is high in pollution intensity. Finally, the post-industrial one where people
demand higher levels of environmental quality. This state is low in pollution
intensity because individuals show a high environmental concern, but also be-
cause they have the needed resources to abate pollution. According to this,
an eventual improvement of the environment may arise from the increased
demand for environmental protection, based on the increased willingness to
18pay for environmental care at higher levels of income per capita.
On the other hand, there is an empirically well-documented demographic
relationship between per capita income levels and population growth rates,
the demographic transition phenomenon, which happens along the develop-
ment process. This transition has very clear implications for the rates of pop-
u l a t i o ng r o w t hi na g r i c u l t u r a l ,o rs u b s istence, industrializing and services-
oriented economies respectively [Kremer (1993), Mincer (1995), Dahan and
Tsiddom (1998), Tabata (2003)]. In general, the demographic transition oc-
curs along three stages of development. At stage I both birth and death
rates are high, and the population grows slowly. At stage II, because of the
improved sanitation and health care, the death rate falls. However, the birth
rate remains high, and the population grows rapidly. At stage III, because of
the changes in marginal costs and beneﬁts of having children, the birth rate
falls approaching the death rate, which has remained low. The population
grows again slowly.
Combining the two previous ingredients we conclude that development
and income growth provoke fundamental changes in the economy, in such
a way that we can ﬁrst postulate for low rates of population growth and
high environmental concern at the initial stages of the development process,
when economies are essentially agricultural and they suﬀer a limited im-
pact from economic activities on the environment. Then, at the interme-
diate stages, when economies become fundamentally industrial, the rates of
population growth are higher and the environmental concern lower. Thus,
increased emission of pollutants and more dirty technologies lead to increase
the environmental damage. Finally, for high developed and basically services-
19oriented economies the rates of population growth are again low and the envi-
ronmental concern high. Now, cleaner technologies and a growing ability and
willingness to pay for a better environment lead to reduce the environmental
degradation. Therefore, we can modelize a long term EKC on the basis of the
evolution and changes experienced by two structural parameters of the model
alone. In the long term, the economy moves from the less-developed state
with a low level of income per capita towards the more developed one with
higher levels of income per capita. According to what has been said above,
this economy may be characterized with the corresponding low or high values
of the rate of population growth, n, and the environmental concern, α,f o r
any given set of invariant parameters A, ρ and Φ.
Consequently, taking into account the comparative statics results for the







,w ec a nh y p o t h -
esize the following relationship between the level and the rate of growth of
the per capita income
γ = φy(2ω − y),( 3 0 )
where the constant and positive parameter φ represents the transformation
coeﬃcient from the level to the rate of growth, and ω stands for the level
of income per capita for which the maximum rate of growth is attained.
Moreover, the result shown in (29) allows us to transform from the rate of












y(2ω − y).( 3 1 )
Finally, we may connect with the emissions ﬂow, E,u s i n gt h ef u n c t i o n
E (1 − z), which has been characterized before as a function satisfying E0 <
200, lim
x→0+ E0 < 0, −∞ < lim
x→1− E0 < 0, E00 < 0, E (0) = EM > 0 and E (1) = 0.




















.( 3 2 )
This function shows the properties: (i) ∂E
∂y = −E0 2αφ
A(1+α) (ω − y) T 0,
being positive for y<ω and negative for y>ω,a n d( ii) ∂2E
∂y2 = E0 2αφ
A(1+α) <
0, ∀y. Consequently, the relationship between emissions ﬂow and income
per capita is strictly concave, increasing for low levels of income per capita
and decreasing for higher levels of this variable beyond the critical value ω.
This pattern just replicates the observed hump-shaped relationship between
pollution and income6, and emerges as a direct consequence of the inverted
U-shaped relationship between z, the index of dirtiness associated with the
technique, and the level of activity y, as obtained in (31). Moreover, it can
be easily checked that, for any given level of per capita income, emissions
are higher as lower is the capital productivity A and the relative weight of
environmental care in utility α, but also as higher is the population rate of
growth n, the transformation coeﬃcient φ, and the exogenous level of income
per capita ω.
One variable which has played an important role in the discussion of the
EKC hypothesis is the income elasticity of demand for environmental quality.
The value of this elasticity is placed among the main factors causing the
downturn of polluting emissions, but there is not a general consensus about
6Recent empirical studies have shown that, for some countries and pollutants, the
best functional form is cubic, implying that for very high levels of income per capita
environmental degradation starts to increase again [Torras and Boyce (1998)].
21the exact deﬁnition of this ‘good’ with respect to income [Magnani (2000)].
In spite of the fact that many authors have claimed that environment is a
luxury good and the income elasticity is above unity, others manifest serious
doubts about this assumption and even prove that it is neither a necessary
nor suﬃcient condition for the EKC hypothesis to be satisﬁed [McConnell
(1997)]. In our framework, the abatement eﬀort is an indirect indicator of the
environmental quality. If we rewrite (3) in per capita terms as b =( 1− z)y,
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The last term on the r.h.s. is positive for y<ω and negative for y>
ω. Consequently, the income elasticity of demand for environmental quality
²b,y is less than one for y<ω but bigger than one for y>ω.T h a t i s ,
along the initial stages of development the elasticity of abatement eﬀort to
income remains below unity, but for higher development levels this elasticity
becomes greater than one. Accordingly, the environmental quality appears as
a luxury good only for high levels of income per capita: as countries get richer
abatement expenditures will increase, but only when a certain level of income
per capita has been surpassed will they increase more than proportionally
reducing z and, hence, pollution emissions too. This feature is also shown
by many other goods, as for example education, with which environmental
quality shares an important property: they all generate positive externalities
over the economy.
Our view of the EKC may be supported by a vast empirical literature
which, analyzing cross-sectional or panel data, ﬁnds that economic growth
22and development bring an initial phase of environmental deterioration fol-
lowed by a subsequent phase of improvement. The picture has been perfectly
summarized by Panayotou (1993) in the following sentences: “At low levels
of development both the quantity and intensity of environmental degradation
is limited to the impacts of subsistence economic activity on the resource base
and to limited quantities of biodegradable wastes. As economic development
accelerates with the intensiﬁcation of agriculture and other resource extrac-
tion and the take oﬀ of industrialization, the rates of resource depletion begin
to exceed the rates of resource regeneration, and waste generation increases
in quantity and toxicity. At higher levels of development, structural change
towards information-intensive industries and services, coupled with increased
environmental awareness, enforcement of environmental regulations, better
technology and higher environmental expenditures, result in leveling oﬀ and
gradual decline of environmental degradation”. Therefore, the EKC hypothe-
sis accounts for an evolutionary progression associated with diﬀerent stages of
the development process, as historically followed by many nations, from clean
agricultural economies to clean services economies, going through polluting
industrial economies with high detrimental eﬀects on the environmental qual-
ity.
Despite the previous considerations about the classical hypothesis of an
inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution emissions and per capita
income levels, only a very superﬁcial interpretation of its meaning could lead
the analysts to believe that the best thing the policy-makers can do is to
keep away of active environmental protection policies. Actually, growth is
not a panacea for the environment [Arrow et al. (1995)]. As we have seen,
23the externality associated with pollution emissions and abatement makes
the environmental problem very diﬃcult, if not impossible, to resolve in
a competitive decentralized economy. Consequently, in no one case can be
expected that the pollution problem will automatically be solved as a result of
economic growth without government interventions and active environmental
policies.
In this paper, while studying the socially optimal solution to the environ-
mental problem as opposed to the decentralized one, we have identiﬁed diﬀer-
ent opportunities for government interventions. First of all, an institutional
one, which involves the government correcting the externality associated with
pollution, by enforcing property rights and contracts as well as setting the
usual pollution standards and taxation that make the competitive economy
to work eﬃciently. Alternatively, the government may develop an allocative
function, which implies a direct participation providing the economy with
public abatement. Moreover, from a long term perspective, the government
has an important role to play implementing indirect environmental policies
such as information or awareness campaigns [Chevé (2000)]. These poli-
cies look to inﬂuence fecundity behavior of households and social preferences
for environmental protection. Hence, increasing participation makes peo-
ple more environmentally conscious, increases the demand for environmental
quality and prevents the environment to be felt as an obstacle to growth
[Bimonte (2001)]. Moreover, population control policies and other develop-
ment encouraging actions that accelerate the demographic transition, can
help to reduce environmental degradation at low income levels and speed up
improvements at higher income levels. Taken together, the above-mentioned
24policies may aﬀect in the long term both the population growth rate and the
environmental willingness to pay. Namely, the two main parameters in our
explanation of the environmental Kuznets curve.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have built a general equilibrium one-sector endogenous
growth model in which pollution is a by-product of economic activity but it
may be reduced by spending a fraction of the aggregate output on abatement.
We consider the existence of a welfare pollution externality associated with
the emissions ﬂow, and then we study the socially optimal equilibrium. We
have proved that the optimal path does exists, it is unique, and does not show
transitional dynamics. We found that the rate of growth depends negatively
on the weight of environmental care in utility and positively on the population
growth rate. Moreover, the latter eﬀe c ti ss t r o n g e ra sh i g h e ri st h ew e i g h t
of environment in the utility function. We also found a trade-oﬀ between
growth and environmental quality because increased abatement eﬀort crowds
out resources from capital accumulation and growth.
Using this framework, we have got an alternative explanation for the
environmental Kuznets curve, which relates the emissions ﬂow to the stage
of development of a country. Our construction relies on two structural pa-
rameters: the rate of population growth and the households environmental
concern. At the initial stage of the development process economic activity
has a limited impact on the environment. At the intermediate stage, however,
economic activity increases pollution intensity which results in an increasing
25environmental damage. Finally, as the economy becomes highly developed,
pollution intensity decreases and economic activity appears associated with
environmental improvements. In the case of low income developing countries
there is evidence that, for local pollutants, an eventual reduction in emissions
emerges with higher levels of income per capita as the willingness and ca-
pability to pay for pollution abatement increase and the population growth
rate decreases.
Growth creates the conditions for environmental improvement by raising
the demand for environmental quality once it has been reached high levels
of income per capita, but policy makers should not assume that economic
growth will automatically solve pollution problems. Economic growth is not
a substitute for environmental public policies, which are necessary to control
pollution emissions. There is no reason to believe that the eventual positive
relationship linking growth and environmental quality is inevitable, because
even though economic growth directly fosters higher abatement expenditures,
it also increases pollution. Moreover, environmental damage need not be in-
extricably linked to economic growth since, for this to be validated, we need
conscious public interventions to protect environment. Therefore, policy has
a very important role to play because, on one hand, economic development
alone is not suﬃcient to avoid irreversible damages and, on the other hand,
ap e r m a n e n tc o n ﬂict between economic policies encouraging growth and en-
vironmental quality seems to be omnipresent.
In this context, some policies can help to promote both sustained growth
and the environment. Since environmental preferences and population growth
rates are decisive in this framework, government may implement indirect poli-
26cies such as information and awareness campaigns that make people more
environmentally conscious, enhance education levels, improve health, and
perform population control actions that precipitate the demographic tran-
sition process. These long term policies should be complemented with the
more direct ones which focus on incentives to adopt cleaner technologies using
environmental corrective taxes and subsidies. Summing up, it is important
to implement policies that involve people in the growth and decision making
processes.
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